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FAMILY LAW - JOINT CUSTODY - A TRIAL COURT HAS
THE AUTHORITY TO AWARD JOINT CUSTODY UNDER ITS
EQUITY POWERS, BUT SHOULD CONSIDER A VARIETY OF
FACTORS BEFORE DETERMINING THAT A JOINT CUSTODY
AWARD IS APPROPRIATE. Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 508 A.2d
964 (1986).
A husband sued his wife for divorce a vinculo matrimonii 1 and for
custody of the couple's two children. 2 The wife also sought custody of
both children. 3 The trial judge granted the husband a divorce a vinculo
matrimonii and ordered that the parents have joint custody of the children.4 The court of special appeals affirmed the trial court's decree. s
The court of appeals vacated and remanded the judgment because the
court could not determine the exact nature of the trial court's custody
order. 6 The court held, however, that a trial judge, in his exercise of
equity power, may order joint custody of children after considering those
factors identified by the court as relevant to joint custody awards. 7
A court's jurisdiction in child custody stems from a state's general
power of parens patriae. 8 This power, which is quite broad, is delegated
1. Taylor v. Taylor, 60 Md. App. 268, 482 A.2d 164 (1984), vacated, 306 Md. 290, 508

2.
3.
4,

5.

6.

7.

8.

A.2d 964 (1986). A divorce a vinculo matrimonii dissolves the marriage contract
completely. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 70 (Abridged 5th ed. 1983).
Taylor, 306 Md. at 293-94, 508 A.2d at 965-66. The children were two and three
years old and were living in the marital home with their father at the time the
husband filed for divorce.
[d.
Taylor, 60 Md. App. at 272, 482 A.2d at 165. Joint custody includes the concepts of
joint legal custody and joint physical custody. Joint legal custody means that the
parents share decisions concerning the child and neither parent has a superior right
over the other. Joint physical custody means that the parents share the obligation to
shelter the child and make day-to-day decisions. This obligation may be divided in
numerous ways such as one parent having the child during the school year and the
other during vacation, or divided between weeks. Taylor, 306 Md. at 296-97, 508
A.2d at 967.
Taylor, 60 Md. App. at 277, 482. A.2d at 168. The wife appealed the decision on
three grounds: (I) the trial court did not have the authority to grant joint custody;
(2) if the trial judge did have such authority, the trial judge abused his discretion in
awarding joint custody where neither party requested or agreed to joint custody;
and (3) if the trial judge did have the authority to award joint custody sua sponte,
the judge abused his discretion under the facts. Brief for Appellant at i, Taylor v.
Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 508 A.2d 964 (1986) (No. 85-23).
The order appeared to provide for joint physical custody, but was silent with respect
to legal custody. The court of appeals also manqated full consideration of the child
custody issue in light of the joint custody criteria identified. Taylor, 306 Md. at 31113, 508 A.2d at 975.
[d. at 301-11, 508 A.2d at 969-74. The court delineated the major factors that
should be considered in determining the appropriateness of joint custody because it
recognized the danger to children of awarding joint custody without careful consideration of the advantages and disadvantages. See id. at 302-03, 508 A.2d at 970.
See, e.g., L. HOCHHEIMER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW RELATING TO THE CUSTODY OF INFANTS INCLUDING PRACTICE AND FORMS § 23 (2d ed. 1891); Ross v.
Pick, 199 Md. 341, 351, 86 A.2d 463, 468 (1952).
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to courts in their exercise of general equity jurisdiction. 9 Traditionally,
courts have had the power to make temporary arrangements for the
child,IO to determine who shall have permanent custody of the child, II
and to modify or amend a custody decree. 12 Additionally, courts are not
required to abide by custody agreements l3 or to heed the claim by one
party for custody of a child over another party who does not seek custody.14 Thus, courts intheir exercise of equity power historically have
maintained broad discretion in fashioning custody decrees.
In their exercise of equity jurisdiction, courts have relied on various
legal principles in the custody decision making process. IS At English
common law, a father had a property right to his children and custody
almost inevitably was given to him.16 In the colonial courts, the father's
duty to support and discipline his children formed the basis of his right
to custody.17 It was not until the middle of the nineteenth century that
the father's right to custody gave way to the tender years doctrine. This
doctrine, which posited that very young children need to be with their
mothers, resulted in mothers gaining custody. IS The origin of the tender
years doctrine has been traced to the Maryland case of Helms v.
Franciscus. 19
9. L. HOCHHEIMER, supra note 8, § 23. In divorce proceedings, jurisdiction over child
custody attaches as soon as the custody of a child becomes an issue. Id. § 71.
10. Id. § 73; see also In re Welch, 74 N.Y. 299 (1878) (temporary custody awarded to
one other than legal guardian). Temporary custody arrangements give the court
time to decide permanent custody.
11. E.g., In re Arlene G., 301 Md. 355, 361, 483 A.2d 39, 42 (1984); Ross v. Hoffman,
280 Md. 172, 174, 372 A.2d 582, 585 (1977).
12. E.g., L. HOCHHEIMER, supra note 8, § 79; Ross, 280 Md. at 174, 372 A.2d at 585.
13. Mazur v. Lazarus, 196 A.2d 477, 478 (D.C. 1964); L. HOCHHEIMER, supra note 8,
§ 75.
14. See, e.g., Mullinix v. Mullinix, 12 Md. App. 402, 411, 278 A.2d 674, 678 (1971);
Finlay v. Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 433-34, 148 N.E. 624, 626 (1925).
15. See generally Ester, Maryland Custody Law - Fully Committed to the Child's Best
Interests?, 41 MD. L. REV. 225 (1982) (contains an excellent discussion of the history and development of child custody principles).
16. E.g., Montgomery County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 41415,381 A.2d 1154, 1160 (1977); Davidson & Gerlach, Child Custody Disputes: The
Child's Perspective, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN (R. Horowitz & H. Davidson
eds. 1984 & Supp. 1986). But cf Shelley v. Westbrooke, 37 Eng. Rep. 850 (1817)
(the poet Percy Bysshe Shelley lost custody of his children because he was an
atheist).
17. E.g., McAndrew v. McAndrew, 39 Md. App. I, 4, 382 A.2d 1081, 1083 (1978);
Sanders, 38 Md. App. at 415, 381 A.2d at 1160.
18. Davidson & Gerlach, supra note 16, at 234. The doctrine first appeared in
Talfourd's Act in England in 1839 which gave the court authority to award custody
of children under seven to the mother. Miller, Joint Custody, 13 FAM. L.Q. 345,
354 (1979).
19. 2 Bland Ch. 519 (Md. 1826). In Helms, the court summarized the evolving approach: "[y]et even a Court of common law will not go so far as to hold nature in
contempt, and snatch helpless, puling infancy from the bosom of an affectionate
mother, and place it in the coarse hands of the father." Id. at 536; accord Chapsky
v. Woods, 26 Kan. 650 (1881); United States v. Green, 26 F. Cas. 30, 31-32
(C.C.D.R.1. 1824) (No. 15256); Jenkins v. Jenkins, 173 Wis. 592, 181 N.W. 826
(1921).
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The maternal preference presumption, a corollary to the tender
years doctrine, has guided courts in making custody determinations since
the early twentieth century.20 Under the maternal preference presumption, the mother, absent compelling circumstances, was given custody of
the child. 21 The maternal preference presumption differed from the
tender years doctrine in that the presumption applied regardless of the
age of the child. In McAndrew v. McAndrew, the court of special appeals
abrogated the maternal preference presumption in Maryland. 22 The McAndrew court examined a 1974 amendment to a Maryland custody statute that provided "in any custody proceeding, neither parent shall be
given preference solely because of his or her sex,"23 and concluded that
the legislature intended to abolish the maternal preference presumption.24 Some states, however, still apply the maternal preference presumption in making child custody decisions. 25
Courts have also recognized a presumption against an adulterous
parent. 26 This presumption was gradually relaxed in Maryland until it
was abrogated in Davis v. Davis. 27 The Davis court recognized adultery
as relevant only when it had an effect on the child and consequently
reflected on lack of parental fitness. 28 Other states have followed
20. See Hines v. Hines, 192 Iowa 569, 572, 185 N.W. 91, 92 (1921); Hild v. Hild, 221
Md. 349, 157 A.2d 442 (1960); Tuter v. Tuter, 120 S.W.2d 203, 205 (Mo. App.
1938); Freeland v. Freeland, 92 Wash. 482, 483-84, 159 P. 698, 699 (1916).
Commentators have criticized the maternal preference presumption as a violation of equal protection. See, e.g., M. ROMAN & W. HADDAD, THE DISPOSABLE
PARENT: THE CASE FOR JOINT CUSTODY 34-45 (1978); Rabbino, Joint Custody,
Toward the Development of Judicial Standards, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 105, 108
(1979). At least one commentator, however, has suggested that tilting the scales
toward mothers in custody decisions helps to correct structural inequalities found
within the family unit such as wage differentials between husband and wife. P.
CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL: THE BATILE FOR CHILDREN AND CUSTODY 439
(1986) (quoting H. LEVINE & A. ESTABLE, THE POWER POLITICS OF MOTHERHOOD (1983) (unpublished manuscript».
21. See supra note 20.
22. 39 Md. App. I, 382 A.2d 1081 (1978).
23. [d. at 8, 382 A.2d at 1085.
24. [d., 382 A.2d at 1086.
25. The presumption operates either as a tiebreaker when all things between the parents
are equal, or the presumption requires courts to award custody to the mother absent
a finding of the mother's unfitness. Eg., Fitzpatrick v. Fitzpatrick, 4 Ohio App. 2d
279, 207 N.E.2d 794 (1965) (award to mother as long as she is fit); McCreery v.
McCreery, 218 Va. 352,355,237 S.E.2d 167, 168 (1977) (tiebreaker).
26. Eg., Davidson & Gerlach, supra note 16, at 238; L. HOCHHEIMER, supra note 8,
§ 75. Maryland courts had recognized this presumption. See, e.g., Palmer v.
Palmer, 238 Md. 327, 331, 207 A.2d 481,483 (1965); Wallis v. Wallis, 235 Md. 33,
36-37, 200 A.2d 164, 165-66 (1964).
27. 280 Md. 119, 372 A.2d 231, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 939 (1977).
28. Swain v. Swain, 43 Md. App. 622,406 A.2d 680 (1979). Remnants of the presumption still surface. In Taylor, the judge mentioned the mother's indiscretion as a
factor in his custody decision without having any further information about how the
children might have been affected by the mother's behavior. Taylor v. Taylor, 60
Md. App. 268, 271, 482 A.2d 164, 165, vacated, 306 Md. 290, 508 A.2d 964 (1986).
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suit. 29
A growing concern for the child led to modifications in the judicial
approach used to determine child custody. 3D Although courts always
have considered the welfare of the child, many courts eventually discarded old presumptions31 and adopted a standard based solely upon the
best interests of the child. This standard, adopted in the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act,32 is the approach currently favored by the majority of states. 33 Maryland follows this approach in all custody decisions.
In Montgomery County Department of Social Services v. Sanders,34 the
court of special appeals set forth the criteria for judicial determination of
a child's best interests. 35
29. See, e.g., Bartley v. Bartley, 197 Neb. 246, 248 N.W.2d 39 (1976); K.L.H. v.
G.D.H., 318 Pa. Super. 330, 464 A.2d 1368 (1983); Spaulding v. Spaulding, 278
N.W.2d 639 (S.D. 1979).
30. Montgomery County Dep't of Social Servs. v. Sanders, 38 Md. App. 406, 416, 381
A.2d 1154, 1161 (1977).
31. See supra notes 15-29 and accompanying text.
32. UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 197-98 (1987). The
Act provides:
The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interest of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody;
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian;
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent
or parents, his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect
the child's best interest;
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved.
The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that
does not affect his relationship to the child.
Id.
33. See, e.g., Cappetta v. Cappetta, 196 Conn. 10, 16,490 A.2d 996,999 (1985); Costigan v. Costigan, 418 A.2d 1144, 1146 (Me. 1980); Williamson v. Williamson, 122
Mich. App. 667, 672-73, 333 N.W.2d 6, 7-8 (1982); Fitzgibbon v. Fitzgibbon, 197
N.J. Super. 63, 67,484 A.2d 46, 48 (1984); Coulter v. Stewart, 97 N.M. 616, 617,
642 P.2d 602, 603 (1982). A number of commentators have criticized the standard
for being ambiguous and destructive in its dependence on judicial discretion. See
Sanders, 38 Md. App. at 419-20, 381 A.2d at 1163; Robinson, Joint Custody; Constitutional Imperatives, 54 CINN. L. REV. 27, 59-60 (1985). The standard has been
attacked for subordinating the child's interests to that of the parents', and thus commentators have urged a "least detrimental alternative" standard which focuses primarily on placing the child with the psychological parent. "A psychological parent
is one who, on a continuing day-to-day basis, through interaction, companionship,
interplay, and mutuality, fulfills the child's psychological needs for a parent, as well
as the child's physical needs." A. FREUD, J. GOLDSTEIN & A. SOLNIT, BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 53-64, 98 (1973).
34. 38 Md. App. 406,381 A.2d 1154 (1977).
35. The Sanders decision identified the following factors: (1) fitness of the parents;
(2) character and reputation of the parties; (3) desire of the natural parents and
agreements between the parties; (4) potentiality of maintaining natural family relations; (5) preference of the child; (6) material opportunities affecting the future life
of the child; (7) age, health, and sex of the child; (8) residences of parents and
opportunity for visitation; (9) length of separation from the natural parents; and
(lO) prior voluntary abandonment or surrender. Id. at 420, 381 A.2d at 1163.
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A small but increasing number of states have determined that the
best interests of the child require consideration of which parent provides
the primary care for the child. 36 Primary caretakers perform such tasks
as meal preparation, bathing, disciplining, and educating. 37 Courts employing this approach emphasize the primary caretaker role because a
custody award to the primary caretaker helps to ensure that the child has
continuing access to the parent who has tended to the child's psychological and physical needs. 38
Many states consider joint custody as a possible means of furthering
the best interests of the child. 39 In furthering such interests, these states
have taken four approaches.
Under the first approach, a court awards joint custody to the parents if there are no circumstances compelling an award of custody to one
parent or the other.40 There are two standards a court applies to deter36. Annotation, Primary Caretaker Role of Respective Parents as Factor in Awarding
Custody of Child, 41 A.L.R.4th 1129 (1985) (analyzes cases where courts have considered which parent was the primary caretaker).
37. The primary caretaker standard was enunciated most clearly in Garska v. McCoy,
278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981). The Garska court identified ten factors to apply in
determining which parent is the primary caretaker:
(1) preparing and planning of meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning, and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and trips to physicians; (5) arranging for social interaction
among peers after school, i.e. transporting to friends' houses or girl or boy
scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative care, i.e. babysitting, day-care,
etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in the middle of
the night, waking child in the morning; (8) disciplining, i.e. teaching general manners and toilet training; (9) educating, i.e. religious, cultural, social, etc.; and, (10) teaching elementary skills, i.e., reading, writing and
arithmetic.
Id. at 363. See generally Polik, Why are Mothers Losing: A Brief Analysis of Criteria
Used in Child Custody Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RIGHTS LAW RPTR. 235, 24143 (1982) (analyzes the Garska opinion).
38. See In re Maxwell, 8 Ohio App. 3d 302, 306, 456 N.E.2d 1218, 1222 (1982).
39. See infra notes 40-57 and accompanying text. Severe criticism of sole custody and
the pressure of father's rights activists led the courts to consider joint custody in
their decision making. Sole custody has been criticized for promoting pathology by
weakening the father-child relationship, burdening the mother, and promoting intense court battles. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 18, at 355-59; Robinson, supra note
33, at 31-32; ROMAN & HADDAD, supra note 20. One commentator, however, has
suggested that joint custody only became popular as a tool to fight the feminist
demand for men and women to share parenting, and to help fathers avoid paying
child support. P. CHESLER, supra note 20, at 433-34, 439.
40. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61. 13(2)(b)2 (West Supp. 1988); IDAHO CODE § 32-717B
(1983); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 146 (West 1988); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
208, § 31 (West 1987); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (1986). This approach is advocated by father's rights activists. ROMAN & HADDAD, supra note 20, at 173. One
commentator has argued that there is a constitutional right to custody of one's children and that a joint custody presumption is necessary to recognize this right.
Robinson, supra note 33, at 29. But cf P. CHESLER, supra note 20, at 433 (joint
custody presumptions discourage joint parenting during marriage because the father
knows he can get custody later and thus, joint custody presumptions result in the
continuation of male dominance).
Vermont has indicated that joint custody is presumed to be against the best
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mine if joint custody should be bypassed for an award of sole custody.
The first is satisfied if the court finds that joint custody would be detrimental to the child. 41 The second standard is satisfied if the court finds
that joint custody would not be in the child's best interests. 42 Essentially,
the "detriment standard" requires a specific showing of the harm that
would come to the child, whereas the best interests standard allows the
court to consider a broader range of factors.
Under the second approach, the court primarily considers whether
the parents agree on joint custody. Eight states invoke a presumption for
joint custody upon parental agreement43 and three states permit the
court to consider joint custody only if the parents agree. 44 In the eight
states using the presumption, the trial judge who declines to award joint
custody generally must state the reasons for the denia1. 45 Those states
permitting awards of joint custody upon parental' agreement leave more
discretion to the trial judge,46 who may consider other relevant factors
such as whether the parents have an understanding of the rights and responsibilities of joint custody.47
The third approach concerns joint custody upon the application of
one parent. Most states using this approach consider the request of one
parent for joint custody as a factor to be weighed, leaving the court with
broad power to determine if joint custody is in the best interests of the
child. 48 Two states, however, invoke a joint custody presumption upon

41.
42.

43.

44.

45.
46.
47.
48.

interests of the child and that an award of joint custody requires a specific finding of
special circumstances. Lumbra v. Lumbra, 136 Vt. 529, 532, 394 A.2d 1139, 1142
(1978).
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13(2)(b)2. For example, if one parent's household is abusive
or neglectful then it would be harmful for a child to live with that parent. Robinson, supra note 33, at 61.
IDAHO CODE § 32-717B; LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 146c(2); MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 208, § 31; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1. In Louisiana, for example, the
inability of the parents to cooperate is sufficient to show that joint custody is not in
the child's best interests. Turner v. Turner, 455 So. 2d 1374, 1380 (La. 1984). But
cf Baudoin v. Herbert, 463 So. 2d 78 (La. Ct. App. 1985) (court required father to
post property bond to ensure compliance with joint custody award).
CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5 (West Supp. 1987); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46B-56a
(West 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(6) (Supp. 1987); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 518.17(2) (West Supp. 1988); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-5-24(4) (Supp. 1987);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-224 (1987); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.490 (1986); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.17 (1983).
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3109.04 (Page Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 107.169
(1987); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.24(1)(b) (West 1981).
See supra note 43. Maine requires substantial evidence to overcome the presumption. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 752(6).
See supra note 44. In Oregon, however, the court cannot order sole custody when
the parties agree to joint custody; the court can later modify the order. OR. REV.
STAT. § 107.169.
See In re Bolin, 336 N.W.2d 441, 447 (Iowa 1983).
HAW. REV. STAT. § 571-46 (1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41 (West Supp. 1987);
MICH. COMPo LAWS ANN. § 722.26a (West Supp. 1987); MISS. CODE ANN. § 93-524(3) (Supp. 1987); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 458.17 (1983); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
12, § 1275.4 (West Supp. 1988).

180

Baltimore Law Review

[Vol. 17

the application of either party.49
The fourth approach, adopted by the majority of jurisdictions, employs no presumptions and leaves the court with broad discretion in considering joint custody. 50 This approach allows the court to award joint
custody without a request by either party51 or to deny joint custody even
if requested by both. 52 Some states have identified factors to guide trial
judges in the exercise of this discretion. 53 For example, New York courts
have concluded that parental capability to cooperate in matters affecting
the interests of their children is a minimum condition to an award of
joint custody. 54 In Beck v. Beck,55 a New Jersey court determined that
the threshhold question in a joint custody consideration is whether the
child has an established relationship with both parents so as to recognize
each as a source of love. 56 Under the New Jersey approach, an award of
joint custody would be inappropriate if the child has not established such
a relationship with both parents. 57
49. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 518.17(2) (West Supp. 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 40-4-224
(1987).
50. See, e.g., Ezell v. Hammond, 447 So. 2d 766 (Ala. Civ. App.1985); COLO. REV.
STAT. § 14-10-124 (1987); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 403.270 (Baldwin 1983); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 50-13.2(b) (1984); 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5304 (Purdon Supp.
1987); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-101 (Supp. 1987).
Washington's Parenting Act of 1987 structures the trial judge's discretion by
providing that a joint custody agreement between the parties is to be approved
where it is consistent with specified limitations on parental decision making and
where it is knowing and voluntary. The statute also provides that joint custody is
not to be awarded when both parents are opposed to mutual decision making or
where one parent's opposition is reasonable. Parenting Act of 1987, ch. 460, § 9(z)
1987 Wash. Legis. Servo 556, 566 (West).
51. Beck V. Beck, 86 N.J. 480,432 A.2d 63 (1981). The trial judge in Beck apparently
attended a custody conference during a weekend recess and subsequently decided
that joint custody might be the correct award. P. CHESLER, supra note 20, at 258.
52. In re Ford, 470 N.E.2d 357, 362 (Ind. Ct. App. 1984) (court not bound by parties'
agreement to joint custody and thus, judge did not abuse discretion in awarding sole
custody to father); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.021 (Vernon Supp. 1988).
53. One commentator has outlined three conditions that should be established before
awarding joint custody: (1) parental fitness, (2) some degree of cooperation between
ex-spouses, and (3) some sharing of child rearing values between ex-spouses. Miller,
supra note 18, at 369-70.
54. Braiman V. Braiman, 44 N.Y.2d 584, 378 N.E.2d 1019, 407 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1978);
Dodd V. Dodd, 93 Misc. 2d 641,403 N.Y.S.2d 401 (1978); accord Smith V. Smith,
673 P.2d 282 (Alaska 1983) (court rejected joint custody on finding that parents
could not cooperate); Wilcox V. Wilcox, 108 Mich. App. 488, 495,310 N.W.2d 434,
437 (1981) (court must consider parental capacity to cooperate if joint custody is
raised sua sponte); Brisco V. Brisco, 713 S.W.2d 586, 590 (Mo. App. 1986) (joint
custody requires evidence that parents are "emotionally equipped to deal with each
other as equal partners in the care of their child"); In re Marriage of Clement, 52
Or. App. 101,627 P.2d 1263 (1981) (parties must be capable of cooperating in the
responsibility of child rearing for joint custody to be a proper award).
55. 86 N.J. 480, 432 A.2d 63 (1981).
56. Id. at 497-98, 432 A.2d at 71; see also Mastropole V. Mastropole, 181 N.J. Super.
130, 137-38,436 A.2d 955,959 (1981) (following Beck).
57. Beck, 86 N.J. at 497-98, 432 A.2d at 71.
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In Kerns v. Kerns,58 the Court of Special Appeals of Maryland addressed a trial judge's authority to award joint custody in the absence of
a request or consent by the parties. The Kerns court held that a court
may award joint custody if it is in the best interests of the child. 59 The
Kerns court placed Maryland squarely within the majority approach that
leaves the decision to award joint custody solely within the discretion of
the trial judge. 60 The Kerns decision, however, provides little guidance
to the trial judge faced with this exercise of discretion because the court
failed to identify any factors that might be relevant to a joint custody
decision.
Two years after the Kerns decision, the Court of Appeals of Maryland first addressed the joint custody issue in Taylor v. Taylor. 61 The
Taylor court, like Kerns, held that the circuit court, in its exercise of
equity powers, has the authority to award joint custody.62 The court
reasoned that the authority to determine custody of children is an inherent part of the court's equity power and that any limitation on this power
is a matter for the legislature. 63 Upon review of two relevant statutes,64
58. 59 Md. App. 87, 474 A.2d 925 (1984).
5~. The court concluded that MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A § 1 (1983) authorized joint
custody awards and that prior case law did not prevent such an award. Additionally, the court rejected the appellant's argument that failure of the legislature to pass
a joint custody bill denounced the concept. [d. at 90-94, 474 A.2d at 927-29.
60. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
61. 306 Md. 290, 508 A.2d 964 (1986).
62. /d. at 298, 508 A.2d at 968.
63. [d. Indeed, the court stated that the General Assembly's 1986 amendment to MD.
FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-203(c)(1) (Supp. 1986) providing that a court may
award joint custody as well as sole custody was declarative of existing common law.
[d. at 301, 508 A.2d at 969.
64. The first statute concerned jurisdiction within a court of equity:
(a) Jurisdiction of courts of equity. - A court of equity has jurisdiction
over the custody, guardianship, legitimation, maintenance, visitation and
support of a child. In exercising its jurisdiction, the court may:
(1) Direct who shall have the custody or guardianship of a child;
(2) Determine the legitimacy of a child, pursuant to § 1-208 of the
Estates and Trusts Article of this Code;
(3) Decide who shall be charged with the support and maintenance
of a child, pendente lite or permanently;
(4) Determine who shall 'have visitation rights to a child. At any
time following the termination of a marriage, the court may consider a
petition for reasonable visitation by one or more of the grandparents of a
natural or adopted child or the parties whose marriage has been terminated, and may grant such visitation if the court believes it to be in the
best interests of the child; or
(5) From time to time set aside or modify its decree or order concerning the child.
(b) Jurisdiction of juvenile or criminal court not affected. - Nothing in
this section takes away or impairs the jurisdiction of the juvenile court or
criminal court with respect to the custody, guardianship, maintenance,
visitation, and support of a child. This section does not limit or preclude
paternity proceedings under Article 16 of this Code except after the legitimation of a child under this section.
MD. CTs. & JUD. PROC. CODE ANN. § 3-602 (1980 & Supp. 1983). The current
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the court found that the legislature did not intend to limit an equity
court's broad power to decide child custody matters, and concluded that
a court could grant joint custody of children. 65
The Taylor court did not reach the question of whether the trial
judge abused his discretion in awarding joint custody under the facts of
the case. Nevertheless, the court identified the following factors as relevant to a trial judge's consideration of joint custody: (1) capacity of parents to communicate and reach shared decisions affecting the child's
welfare,66 (2) willingness of parents to share custody,67 (3) fitness of parents,68 (4) relationship established between the child and each parent,69
(5) preference of the child,70 (6) potential disruption of child's social and
schoollife,11 (7) geographic proximity of parental homes,72 (8) demands
of parental employment,73 (9) age and number of children,74 (10) sincer-

65.
66.

67.

68.
69.

70.
71.
72.

73.
74.

relevant statute may be found at MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 1-201 (1984). The
second statute related to custody and guardianship of children:
The father and mother are the joint natural guardians of their child
under eighteen years of age and are jointly and severally charged with its
support, care, nurture, welfare and education. They shall have equal powers and duties, and neither parent has any right superior to the right of the
other concerning the child's custody. If either the father or mother dies,
or abandons his or her family, or is incapable of acting, the guardianship
devolves upon the other parent. Where the parents live apart, the court
may award the guardianship of the child to either of them, but, in any
custody proceeding, neither parent shall be given preference solely because
of his or her sex. Provided: The provisions of this article shall not be
deemed to affect the existing law relative to the appointment of a third
person as guardian of the person of the minor where the parents are unsuitable, or the child's interests would be adversely affected by remaining
under the natural guardianship of its parent or parents.
MD. ANN. CODE art. 72A, § 1 (1983). The current relevant statute may be found at
MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN. § 5-203 (1984 & Supp. 1986).
Taylor, 306 Md. at 297-302, 508 A.2d at 967-70.
Id. at 304-07,508 A.2d at 971-72. The court considered parental ability to communicate about the best interests of the child as the most important factor and indicated that the absence of a "track record" of good communication would be
sufficient to deny joint custody. Id.
Id. at 307-08, 508 A.2d at 972-73. The court considered the presence of a willingness to share custody as a critical factor, but declined to give "either parent veto
power over the possibility of a joint custody award." Id.
Id. at 308, 508 A.2d at 973. Fitness involves psychological and physical capabilities.
Id.
Id. This factor takes the child's psychological and emotional needs into account.
Id.
Id. The weight given to this factor depends on the child's age and discretion. Id.
Id. at 308-09, 508 A.2d at 973. The court differentiated between physical and legal
custody and suggested that any disruption may be alleviated by adjusting physical
custody arrangements without interfering with the concept of joint custody. Id.
Id. at 309, 508 A.2d at 973. Proximity is not a prerequisite to an award of joint
custody. Id.
Id. Flexible employment or different work schedules is preferred. Id.
Id. at 309, 508 A.2d at 973-74. This factor is identified as a practical consideration.
Id.
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ity of parent's request,75 (11) financial status of parents,76 (12) impact on
state or federal assistance,77 (13) benefit to parents,78 and (14) other circumstances that reasonably relate to the issue. 79
By delineating these factors, the Taylor court's decision expands
upon the Kerns rule while remaining consistent with the court of special
appeals decision in Sanders,80 thus maintaining a focus on the best interests of the child. The court adopted a flexible approach which requires
trial judges to consider the implications of awarding joint custody. Unlike those states which have presumptions or bright line tests for when
joint custody awards are appropriate,8) the Taylor court refused to adopt
a simplistic solution to a complex problem.
The Taylor court gave full recognition to the importance of good
parental communication as a factor in determining a child's best interests.82 Commentators have identified this factor as one of the most
critical variables affecting the success or failure of a joint custody arrangement. 83 Additionally, the court gave careful consideration to the
practical demands of joint custody such as parental employment, age and
number of children, and geographic proximity of parental homes. 84
These are considerations which cumulatively have significant bearing on
the stability of a child's living arrangement. 85
The Taylor court, despite its careful consideration of a variety of
factors, failed to address some critical points. 86 The court refused to
adopt a rule requiring agreement of both parties before awarding joint
custody because it believed that a parent who contests joint custody
forcefully during litigation may then cooperate after such an award. 87 In
75. Id. at 309-10, 508 A.2d at 974. This factor recognizes that a parent may demand
joint custody to gain leverage in bargaining on alimony, support, or property concessions. Id.
76. Id. at 310, 508 A.2d at 974. This factor recognizes that joint physical custody
places greater financial burden on both parents. Id.
77. Id. at 310-11, 508 A.2d at 974. Joint custody may have an effect on eligibility for
Aid to Families with Dependent Children and medical assistance because both programs require a showing of an absent parent. Id.
78. Id. at 311, 508 A.2d at 974. This factor gives importance to a parent's feelings and
recognizes that a parent's self-image affects the child. Id.
79. Id. The court here recognized that the trial judge should exercise discretion to examine other factors relevant to the consideration of custody options. Id.
80. See supra notes 34-35 and accompanying text.
8!. See supra notes 40-45, 49 and accompanying text.
82. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
83. J. WALLERSTEIN & J. KELLY, SURVIVING THE BREAKUP 310 (1980); P. CHESLER,
supra note 20, at 434-35.
84. See supra notes 72-74 and accompanying text.
85. See generally Miller, supra note 18, at 371-73 (discusses how the presence or absence
of these factors has an affect on the functioning of a joint custody arrangement).
86. The court itself indicated that the factors identified were not exhaustive. Taylor v.
Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 303, 508 A.2d 964, 970 (1986). Nevertheless, the decision
fails to address points which should have been discussed. See infra notes 87-95 and
accompanying text.
87. Id. at 308, 508 A.2d at 973.
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this respect, the Taylor court did not give adequate recognition to the
factors delineated in Sanders 88 or the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act. 89 The court's reasoning essentially ignores research that shows joint
custody fails when ordered over the objection of one parent. 90 Moreover,
the court's reasoning fails to recognize that parents may refuse to agree
to joint custody for legitimate reasons such as domestic violence. A parent may oppose joint custody to protect herselflhimself or a child from
continued domination by an abusive spouse or parent; abusive individuals frequently seek custody as another way of maintaining control over
the family unit. 91 Although the Taylor court correctly addressed the
sincerity of a parent's request for joint custody,92 the court only focused
on how such a request can be used as a bargaining tool and did not consider the abusive spouse problem. 93 A careful judge should be alert to
this problem and not penalize a parent who has legitimate reasons for
seeking sole custody by awarding joint custody.94
The Taylor court gave consideration to the relationship established
between the child and each parent, but did not address the issue of
whether both parents are primary caretakers. 95 If joint custody is to be
awarded only when it is in the best interests of the child, then the court
should determine whether either parent alone would be a good parent.
This determination necessitates an inquiry into whether each parent performs child care tasks equally. If the answer to this inquiry is no, it
makes little sense to give responsibility for a child's well-being to a parent
who has had little involvement in meeting the child's needs. 96 Continuity
in the relationship between child and caretaker is critical to a child's
socio-emotional development. 97 A focus on primary caretaking would
88. See supra note 35. The court specifically failed to address adequately the "desire of
the natural parents and agreements between the parties" criterion.
89. See supra note 32. Here, the court did not focus on the "wishes of the child's parent
or parents" as to the child custody factor of the Act.
90. Address by Deborah A. Lupenitz, Ph.D., Child Custody: The American Family in
Conflict (October 25, 1986).
91. In one study, sixty-two percent of the fathers seeking custody abused their wives. P.
CHESLER, supra note 20, at 74.
92. Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 309-10, 508 A.2d 964, 974 (1986).
93. Women in abusive situations are forced into first proving the battery, and then that
the battery reflects on the abuser's fitness as a parent. See generally Schulman &
Polik, Child Custody, in WOMEN AND THE LAW § 6.07 (C. Lefcourt ed. 1984) (discusses the problems of battered wives in custody disputes).
94. In Chesler's study, fifty-nine percent of the fathers awarded custody abused their
wives. P. CHESLER, supra note 20, at 82.
95. The Women's Legal Defense Fund, as amicus curiae, urged the court to adopt the
primary caretaker standard. Amicus Brief at 19, Taylor v. Taylor, 306 Md. 290, 508
A.2d 964 (1986) (No. 85-23).
96. One commentator suggests that this applies to joint legal custody as well as joint
physical custody; otherwise, joint legal custody gives rights but not responsibilities
to a parent not involved in caretaking. Polik, supra note 37, at 242. Judges frequently overvalue small contributions of the father. One researcher found that only
twelve percent of the fathers awarded custody were involved in primary care. P.
CHESLER, supra note 20, at 82.
97. A. FREUD, J. GOLDSTEIN, & A. SOLNIT, supra note 33, at 31-34.
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ensure a child's best interests because awards would preserve the bond
between the child and the parent who provides care and nurturance.
Had the court of appeals identified primary caretaking as a major
factor in the consideration of custody awards, Maryland would have
been in the forefront of adopting an approach that fosters co-parenting
during marriage, reduces litigation after marriage, and minimizes the use
of custody as a bargaining tool in settlement proceedings. 98 The primary
caretaker standard would help to achieve such goals because parents
truly interested in their child would be encouraged to share child care
tasks if they knew that, in the event of divorce, they would not recover
custody without a showing of primary caretaking. 99 Moreover, this approach would place the actual caretaker on firmer ground to resist
threats in settlement negotiations made by the disinvolved parent because
a non-caretaking parent would not have a strong bargaining tool and
would be less likely to pursue a custody dispute. loo
Although primary caretaking was well-briefed by amicus curiae, the
Taylor decision ignores primary caretaking and instead places the parents' ability to cooperate in making decisions at the forefront of the
court's analysis. A parent who is removed from child care tasks may
nevertheless demonstrate the requisite "track record" of communication
simply because he or she acquiesced in the other parent's decisions.
Therefore, a court could make a joint custody award to a parent who
never engaged in child care tasks before the marriage break-up, but who
suddenly developed an interest in the child. Such an award clearly
would not be in the best interests of the child because an approach that
focuses on cooperative decision making fails to consider properly the
critical parent-child bond which is developed only through a continuing
relationship between the parent and the child. 101
Overall, the Taylor decision's moderate approach preserves the best
interests of the child standard in joint custody decisions. It leaves the
trial judge with the discretion necessary for case-by-case determinations,
while providing general guidelines for the court's exercise of its broad
equity power. The Taylor court's refusal to adopt a joint custody preference affords substantially more protection for children of divorce than
those jurisdictions employing a joint custody preference with such standards. Unfortunately, the Taylor decision's failure to adopt a primary
caretaker standard does not promote co-parenting or reduce the likelihood of custody battles. Hence, Taylor ultimately fails to afford the
maximum possible protection for children of divorced parents.
Denise Barrett-Benvenga, MS. W

98.
99.
100.
101.

See
See
See
See

supra notes 36-38.
P. CHESLER, supra note 20, at 433.
supra notes 36-38.
supra note 38 and accompanying text.

